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NoTEs
PAYMENTS TO WIDOWS-TAXABLE INCOME?
Ten years ago the Income Tax Unit of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue ruled that "irrespective of a 'plan,' voluntary or involun-
tary, definite or indefinite,... payments made by an employer to the
widow of a deceased officer or employee, in consideration of services
rendered by the officer or employee, are includible in the gross in-
come of the widow for Federal income tax purposes."1 At the time
it was written of this ruling that "it is clear that if I.T. 4027 meets the
approval of the courts, another type of income has been removed
from that very exclusive category of tax-free income."2
The courts, however, have in practice continued to be somewhat
reluctant to tax these payments to widows from the former employers
of their deceased husbands. Courts have maintained a very liberal
view as to these payments. After a number of adverse court deci-
sions the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter referred to as IRS)
declared in 1958 that it would no longer litigate, under the 1939
Code, the taxability of voluntary payments to widows by their de-
ceased husbands' employers, unless there is clear evidence that such
payments are intended to be compensation for services or may be
considered to be dividends.3 The IRS went further, however, and
emphasized that this announcement "represents a litigation policy,
implemented by consistent administrative action, pertaining to 1939
Code cases only."4 Since that announcement the IRS has indicated 5
its position that such payments under the 1954 Code will be taxed to
the widow. Why then is the IRS so obstinate, in the face of the court
decisions in maintaining its contention that these payments are taxable?
First the possible sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
that may be involved in these payments should be examined. The
amounts received may be fully taxable under Section 61 as gross
1 I.T. 4027, 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 9 at 10-11, revoking O.D. 1017, 5 Cum.
Bull. 101 (1921), and modifying I.T. 3329, 1939-2 Cune. Bull. 153. Under I.T.
3329, 1939-2 Cum. Bull. 153, prior to 1950 the Internal Revenue Service held
that a payment by an employer to the widow of a deceased employee, made
without any enforceable obligation, was a gift to the widow. It was also held
that payments were deductible by the employer when paid in recognition of
services rendered by the deceased employee.
2 Note "Payments to Widows of Deceased Employees as Taxable Income
of the Widow-I.T. 4027," 39 Ky. L.J. 363, 367 (1951).3 Rev. Rul. 50-613, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 914.
4 Ibid.
5 See Reed v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky. 1959), where it
was held that where the corporate employer of the taxpayer's deceased husband
paid to the taxpayer, over a period of twelve months, the sum of $50,000, there
was a gift, not includible in taxable income; aff'd, 277 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960).
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income.6 They may also be taxable as annuities under Section 72.7
However, Section 72 contemplates the receipt of these payments under
a contract, but contracts have been noticeably absent in the cases
litigated. Another possibility is that the payments may be excluded
from gross income as gifts under Section 102.8 A fourth possibility
is that the amounts up to $5,000 of the death benefits are excludable
from gross income but that all in excess of that amount would be in-
cluded in gross income under Section 101(b). 9
Generally the payments by an employer to the widow of a deceased
employee are taxable to the widow, as compensation for past services,
unless it can be shown that the payments were intended as a gift to
her. This question ordinarily turns on the determination of whether
the payments were made under an obligation from the employer to
the former employee or his widow or whether the payments were made
voluntarily. If there was a binding obligation to make the payments,
the possibility of a gift is ruled out.
The obligation which binds the employer to make the payments
may take several forms. It is not necessary to have a legal obligation
if there is a moral obligation to make the payments.10 The obligation
may be only the corporation's long-established plan, consistently fol-
lowed, by which valuable employees have been encouraged to remain
in their employment." Also, the obligation may include agreements
or contracts wherein the employer agrees to pay an amount to the
employee's widow or estate following his death.12 Payments made by
an employer to a beneficiary (including a widow) are not gifts even
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61(a), "Except as otherwise provided in this
subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived, includ-
ing (but not limited to) . . . (14) Income in respect of a decedent....7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 72(a), 'Except as otherwise provided in this
chapter, gross income includes any amount received as an annuity (whether for
a period certain or during one or more lives) under an annuity, endowment, or
life insurance contract."
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 102, "Gross income does not include the value
of property acquired by gift. ... "9Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101(b) (1), "Gross income does not include
amounts received (whether in a single sum or otherwise) by the beneficiaries or
the estate of an employer and are paid by reason of the death of the employee.
(2) . . . (A) $5,000 limitation-The aggregate amounts excludable under
paragraph (1) with respect to the death of any employee shall not exceed
$5,000.'
This was Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §22(b)(1)(B) which excluded from
gross income amounts up to $5,000 received "under a contract of an employer
providing for payment of such amounts to the beneficiaries of an employee paid
by reason of the death of the employee."
1o Simpson v. United States, 261 F.2d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1958).
11Ibid; Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951).
12 Hthv. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1951), Amounts taxable
as income included only the excess of amounts received over the commuted
value of the contract for Federal estate tax purposes; Flarsheimn v. United States,
156 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1946). Cf. F. E. Carr, 28 T.C. 779 (1957).
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though the beneficiary has done nothing to earn them, if the payments
are made pursuant to an enforceable contract between the employer
and the employee. This is based on the theory that the recipient has
a legal right to them as a third-party beneficiary. 13 A statute can
provide the binding obligation which will render payments pursuant
thereto taxable as income.14 Termination payments to which the em-
ployee had a right prior to his death but which were paid to his widow
after his death constitute income received under a binding obliga-
tion.15 These cases were decided under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939. However, the position of the IRS is logically the same under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and so far no cases have chal-
lenged the issue.
Voluntary payments, by the former employer to a deceased em-
ployee's widow, provide the great field of controversy. This is the
area in which the IRS and the courts have been in disagreement for
years and still continue to disagree. The basic issue, as regards
voluntary payments, is whether the employer intends that the pay-
ments be gifts to the widow or whether they are compensation for
the deceased husband's past services as an employee.
Congress does not have the power to impose a direct and un-
apportioned tax on amounts received as gifts even under the Six-
teenth Amendment.16 The narrow line of distinction between taxable
compensation and tax-free gifts is illuminated by Bogardus v. Com-
missioner17 on the one side and by Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner' on the other. It is implicit from the Bogardus majority opin-
ion that the determination of whether payments are gifts as distin-
guished from compensation may be a problem to be decided on an
ad hoc basis, usually turning on the intent of the payor. The language
of the Bogardus case would seem to be favorable to declaring volun-
tary payments, by the employer to widows of former employees, to
'3 Rodner v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 283, 235 (S.D. N.Y. 1957), citing
Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
'4 Varnedoe v. Allen, 158 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1946); I.T. 3972, 1949-2 Cum.
Bull. 15; Note, 39 Ky. L.J. 363, 364-365 (1951).
'5 A. NV. Davis, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 814 (1952).10 U. S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U. S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4; U. S. Const.
amend. XVI; United States v. Grace P. Reed, 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky.
1959), aff'd, 277 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960); Cowan v. United States, CCH 1960
Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (60-2 U. S. Tax Cas.) U 9674 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 25, 1960),
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 102(a); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b)(3).
17302 U. S. 34 (1937), where payments to present and former employees
of a corporation, by its former stockholders, acting through a successor corpora-
tion, were held to be gifts.
'8279 U.S. 716, 730 (1929), where payments of income taxes assessable
against compensation of employee were held to be additional taxable income




be gifts. The Court said, "A gift is none the less a gift because in-
spired by gratitude for the past faithful services of the recipient." '
In that case the Court noted that the facts indicated that the inten-
tion of the persons who decided that the payments should be made
"was to make gifts in recognition of, not payments for, former serv-
ices."20 If these payments can be made to former employees and held
to be gifts, a fortiori voluntary payments to their widows should be
held to be gifts.
Prior to 1950 there would have been little question raised over
holding employers' voluntary payments to widows of deceased em-
ployees, made without any enforceable obligation, to be gifts.21 Even
before 1950, however, the Bogardus concept was somewhat curtailed
in one case where it was stated that the payments of additional sums
to an employee before, during, or after termination of service, or to
his estate, are strongly presumed to be made for services rendered
and consequently, are not gifts.2 2 Since 1950 the taxability of these
payments has become more uncertain.
The IRS Position
In 1950, as was mentioned in the beginning of this note, the IRS
changed its ruling by holding that "irrespective of a plan, voluntary
or involuntary, definite or indefinite, payments made by an employer
to the widow of a deceased employee in consideration of services
rendered by the employee are taxable to the widow."23 This ruling
was to become effective January 1, 1951, and was to apply there-
after. Obviously the IRS intended to remove these payments from
the non-taxable category with this ruling.
As a partial alternative to making these payments wholly taxable,
the IRS attempted to limit the exemption to $5,000. The $5,000 ex-
emption was introduced in 1951 as an amendment to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1989.24 In the 1951 amendment, however, the ex-
emption applied only where the benefits were paid "under a contract of
an employer," (emphasis added); these words were omitted in the
1954 version,25 thus making the exemption applicable to all death
benefits both gratuitous and contractual. At least this interpretation
19 Bogardus v. Commissioner, 802 U. S. 84, 44 (1937).
20 Id. at 43.21 See generally Note, 89 Ky. L.T. 863 (1951).
22 Wilkie v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1942).
23 I.T. 4027, 1950-2 Cum Bull. 9 at 10-11, modifying I.T. 3329, 1939-2
Cum. Bull. 153, revoking O.D. 1017, 5 Cum. Bull. 101 (1921) and T.D. 2090
(Dec. 14, 1914); 1 P-H 1960 Fed. Tax Serv. f1 7054.24 Int. Rev. Code of 1989, § 22(b)(1)(A) and (B) as amended by 65 Stat.
483 (1951).
25 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101(b).
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was placed upon the 1954 provision by the judges in two circuits26
by way of dicta in cases decided under the 1939 Code as amended
by the 1951 provision. No doubt this was the intention of the IRS in
removing from the present Code the words "under a contract of an
employer." However, the courts, once they had an opportunity to
interpret this section under the 1954 Code, chose to make it in-
applicable to gratuitous payments.
The Court's Position
In every case since 1950 the courts have held gratuitous payments
by employers to widows of their deceased employees to be gifts
and non-taxable. Furthermore, the Commissioner's position has been
expressly rejected by the overruling of I.T. 4027.27 Whether these
payments are "voluntary" and "gifts" or not, is determined by the in-
tent of the payor or donor. The question is one of fact 28 and where
the employer does not indicate unequivocally whether payments to
the widow are intended as gifts it is for the courts as "triers of the
facts to seek among competing aims or motives the ones that dom-
inated conduct."29 Inasmuch as "intent" is a very elusive and ambigu-
ous term to define, it will be worthwhile to examine some of the
factors which the courts have considered as determining "gratuitous
intent" and some of the factors which the courts have chosen to
minimize.
Some of the factors which the courts, since 1950, have recognized
as showing gratuitous intent are:
(a) The employee had been fully compensated for his services
during his lifetime.2 0
(b) There was no agreement with either the employee or the
widow obligating the employer to make the payments.3 1
(c) The employer had no established policy of making such pay-
ments.32
26 Bounds v. United States, 262 F.2d 876, 878, n. 2 (4th Cir. 1958); Rodner
v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 233, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).2 7 Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom, 24 T.C. 916, 919 (1955); Rodner v.
United States, supra note 26.
28 Alice M. Macfarlane, 19 T.C. 9 (1952).
20Peters v. Smith, 221 F.2d 721, 725 (8d Cir. 1955), citing Bogardus v.
Commissioner, 302 U.S. 84, 45 (1937).
30 Greenberg v. United States, 59-2 U. S. Tax Gas. 11 9676 (D. Neb. 1959);
Estate of Albert W. Morse 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 261 (1958); Carley v. United
States, 163 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Ohio 1958).
31 Greenberg v. United States, supra note 30; Neuhoff v. United States, 58-1
U. S. Tax Cas. 9 9506 (S.D. Fla. 1958). Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom, 24 T.C.
916 (1955).
82 Reed v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky. 1959) affd 277 F.2d
456 (6th Cir. 1960) (Payments were made on 6 previous occasions); Greenberg
(Footnote continued on next page)
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(d) The payment was made to the widow and not to her hus-
band's estate. 3
(e) The corporation derived no benefit for the payment.3 4
(f) The recipient (widow) had performed no services for the
corporation.3 5
Some of the factors which the courts have stated that do not
necessarily imply that an otherwise gratuitous payment is ordinary
income are:
(a) The deceased employee owned at least twenty-five per cent
(25%) of the outstanding stock in the corporation at the
time of his death.36
(b) The amount of the payments was based on the salary which
the deceased employee would have received for the period
over which it was paid (not based on need of the widow),31
(c) A statement was made by the corporation that its reasons
for making the payment were "because of" or "in recognition
of" or "in consideration of" the past services of the deceased
employee.38
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
v. United States, 59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9676 (D. Neb. 1959); Rodner v. United
States, 149 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. N.Y. 1957) (Payments were made on 9 previous
occasions); Estate of John Hekman, 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 304 (1957) (Pay-
ments were made on 8 previous occasions). The establishment of a policy is rather
ambiguous from the court decisions. What is necessary to the recognition by the
courts that the company has an established policy of making payments to widows
of former employees? Apparently the courts look for a pattern which may be fol-
lowed. This raises, however, an additional question as to whether this pattern has
to apply to all employees or only to employees who were executive personnel.
The courts have held that payments of this nature on as many as nine previous
occasions does not constitute an established policy. Rodner v. United States, supra.
33 Esaeof Arthur W. Hellstrom, 24 T.C. 916 (1955); Estate of Albert
W. Morse, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 261 (1958); Rodner v. United States, supra
note 82; Jackson v. Granquist, 169 F. Supp. 442 (D. Ore. 1957); Cf. Estate of
Edward Bausch, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951) (The payment was held to be
income under those circumstances, one of which was that the payment was
made to the estate.); Contra, Estate of Frank J. Foote, 28 T.C. 547 (1958).
34Ett of Arthur W. Hellstrom, supra note 33; Ethel G. Mann, 16 OCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 212 (1957); Estate of Ralph W. Reardon, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
577 (1955); Baur v. United States, 57-1 U. S. Tax Cas. ff 9210 (S.D. Ind. 1956).
35Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom, 24 T.C. 916 (1955); Elizabeth R. Mat-
thews, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 204 (1956); Bledsoe v. United States, 57-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 11 9211 (S.D. Ind. 1956).
36 Carley v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Ohio 1958) (83.63%);
Nixon v. United States, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f1 9982 (E.D. Tenn. 1957) (family
controlled corporation); Jackson v. Granquist, 169 F. Supp. 442 (D. Ore. 1957)
(Deceased and his mother owned 100% of the common stock).
3Redv. United States, 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky. 1959), aff'd 277 F.2d
456 (6th Gir. 1960); Slater v. Riddell, 56-2 U. S. Tax Gas. ff 9892 (S.D. Calif.
1956); Estate of Ralph W. Reardon, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 577 (1955)38 Reed v. United States, supra note 37; Estate of Arthur W. Hestrom, 24
T.C. 916 (1955); Estate of Albert W. Morse, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 261 (1958);
Ethel G. Mann, 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 212 (1957).
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(d) The corporation claimed deductions on its returns for the
amount paid to the widow, inconsistent with the intention
to make a gift.39
(e) The widow owned a large block of the outstanding stock
and was a member of the board of directors of the corpora-
tion when the resolution was adopted to make the payments
to her, although she did not participate in the voting on the
resolution. 40
(f) The corporate resolution authorizing such payments referred
(g) The corporate books called the payments "salary."42
to a "contract."4'
(h) The widow of one of two principal stockholders of a family-
owned corporation received payments pursuant to a volun-
tary agreement between the two principal stockholders that
if either one predeceased his wife, the corporation would
pay to the widow an amount equal to the salary of the de-
ceased at the time of his death for a period not to exceed
one year.43
(i) The corporate resolution authorizing payments to a widow
of amounts equivalent to the salary of her deceased husband
for two years also authorized payments, similarly computed,
to the wives of two living corporate officers upon their hus-
bands' respective deaths.44
(j) At the time the resolution was adopted to make the payments,
the widow was a member of the board of directors, and it is
not clear from the opinion whether the recipient participated
in the voting on the resolution.45
(k) The payment to the widow of the deceased general manager
included salary and bonus. This bonus was nearly twice her
39 flounds v. United States, 262 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1958); Carley v. United
States, 1631 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Ohio 1958); Linoff v. United States, 58-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 11 9204 (D. Minn. 1957); Estate of John Hekman, 16 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 804 (1957). See discussion in Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278,
(1960) where the Court apparently does not accept this inconsistency argument.
40 United States v. Bankston, 254 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1958); Estate of Albert
W. Morse, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 261 (1958); Marie G. Haskell, 14 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 788 (1955) (Where the widow and her daughter owned controlling stock
interest the argument that the payments constituted dividends was negotiated by
the dividend record).
41 Nixon v. United States, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9982 (E.D. Tenn. 1957).42 Nixon v. United States, supra note 41; Ruth Hahn, 13 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 308 (1954); Slater v. Biddell, 56-2 U. S. Tax Cas. fI 9892 (S.D. Calif.
1956).
43United States v. Allinger, 275 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1960) (The District
Court ruled that the wife did not have a vested right to the payments at her
husband's death under the oral contract; thus payments were voluntary).
44 Florence S. Luntz, 29 T.C. 647 (1958).
45 Hardy v. United States, 58-2 U. S. Tax Cas. ff 9521 (W.D. Ky. 1958).
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deceased husband's annual salary, but an identical bonus had
been paid to the officer in the two previous years.4
(1) The deceased employee owned more than seventy per cent
(70%) of the outstanding-voting stock of the corporation.
The widow was on the board of directors but refrained from
voting on the resolution to make these payments. Her de-
ceased husband's stock, however, was voted by the executor.47
(m) Some payments have been in one lump sum while others
have been in monthly installments.4
(n) The time over which the payments extended has not been
significant although attempts to make a "gift" over a period
of more than two years have been infrequent.49
(o) The amount of the payment has not been asserted as an indi-
cation of either a "gift" or "compensation."50
All of these cases cited were decided under the 1939 Code except
for the Reed case 5' and the Cowan case,52 both of which were decided
under the 1954 Code. Although these are only two cases, it is never-
theless apparent from these cases that the courts are taking the
same position under the 1954 Code that they took under the 1939
Code, i.e., that gratuitous payments to widows of deceased em-
ployees are gifts and are not taxable to the widow. This is true
notwithstanding dicta to the contrary in two other federal court
opinions.53 Based on the Reed case and the Cowan case, the limita-
tion of Section 101(b) (2) (a) is not applicable; only Section 102
applies to voluntary and gratituous payments to widows.54 It is sub-
mitted that this is the proper interpretation of the 1954 Code pro-
visions.
46 Elizabeth R. Matthews, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 204 (1956).
47 Bank of the Southwest Nat'l Ass'n, Houston v. United States 165 F. Supp.
200 (S.D. Tex. 1958).48 E.g., Reed v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky. 1959); affd 277
F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960) (monthly installments); Bledsoe v. United States, 57-1
U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9211 (S.D. Ind. 1956). E.g. Rodner v. United States 149 F.
Supp. 233 (S.D. N.Y. 1957) (lump sum payment).49 E.g., Cowan v. United States, CCH 1960 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (60-2
U.S. Tax Cas.) ff 9674 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 25, 1960); (payments over a 24 month
period); E. M. Jones v. Squire, 58-2 U. S. Tax Cas. f1 9588 (W.D. Wash. 1958).
The two-year limitation is derived from the Tax Court's definition of a "imited
period" for deduction of these payments by the employer in I. Putnam, Inc., 15
T.C. 86 (1950), acq., 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 4.50 See, e.g. Reed v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky. 1959),
affd 277 F.2d 456 (6th Gir. 1960) (payments totaled $50,000).
51 Ibid.
52 Cowan v. United States, CCH 1960 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (60-2 U. S.
Tax Cas.) ff 9674 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 25, 1960).
53 Bounds v. United States, 262 F.2d 876, 878, n. 2 (4th Cir. 1958); Rodner
v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 233, 237 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).54 Both sections are in Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
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Employer' Position
Prior to 1951 the payments by an employer to the widow of a
deceased employee were deductible as business expenses, even if
made without a contractual obligation. Under I.T. 3829 55 it was
only necessary that the payments be reasonable and be paid for a
"limited period." However, the courts did not go as far as the impli-
cations of I.T. 3329 but disallowed the deduction in the absence of
a contractual obligation to make the payments even prior to 1951.56
The payments, when deductible, were deductible as additional com-
pensation due.
I.T. 402757 did not alter the effect on the payor for these payments
to widows of deceased employees. Under this ruling, beginning in
1951, the payments, whether voluntary or involuntary, definite or
indefinite, or whether or not made in consideration of services rend-
ered by the employee, were deductible by the payor.
Under the 1954 Code these payments to widows may still con-
stitute a proper deduction but they no longer come under the trade
and business expenses.58 Payments to widows by their deceased
husbands' former employers now are deductible under Section 404.59
Section 404 pertains to pension and annuity plans and compensation
under a deferred-payment plan. Making deductions come under this
section, however, is consistent with the position of the IRS that these
payments are merely additional compensation and taxable as such.30
Where the employer is concerned the questions of when the
deduction may be taken and for how long a period of time are more
important than whether the payments are deductible. Under the 1954
Code"' the deduction is to be available only in the year when the
payments are made. Apparently the Tax Court's current attitude to-
ward the deductibility problem is reflected in Fifth Avenue Coach
Lines, Inc.62 In order to be deductible, the payments need not be
in the nature of additional compensation.63 The payments, in recog-
5 I.T. 8329, 1939-2 Cum. Bull. 153.
56 Fo discussion see Note, 39 Ky. L.J. 363, 363-365 (1951). See also Ethel
M. Black, 55-1 U. S. Tax Gas. ff 9361 (N.D. Ala. 1955); Commissioner v. Bear
Film Co., 219 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1955); Philadelphia-Baltimore Stock Exchange,
19 T.C. 355 (1952).
571.T. 4027, 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 9, modifying I.T. 3329, 1939-2 Cum. Bull.
153; See also Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(a)-9 (1953).5s8 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162; Treas. Reg. 1.162-10 (1958).
59 Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
GO See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co., 30 T.C. 295 (1958).
01 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 404. Under § 162 the accrual-basis taxpayer
could accrue the entire amount of authorized payments in one year, though pay-
ments might be over a period of several years.
0231 T.C. 1080 (1959).
63 Id. at 1096, reafrming I. Putnam, Inc., 15 T.C. 86 (1950).
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nition of past services rendered, are deductible if they are reasonable
and paid only for a "limited period."64 The court noted also that the
"limited period" was construed as a measure of the reasonableness of
the amounts to be paid rather than merely stating a limitation as to
the time over which the payments are made.65 In declaring that the
payments in the Fifth Avenue Coach Lines case were deductible as
an ordinary and necessary business expense, the court gave weight
to the fact that the payor's directors "were aware of the possible
favorable effect created upon the morale and incentive of the [cor-
poration's] ...other executives, and the benefit accruing therefrom
to the [corporation] ... "66
Even this most recent case as to the allowance of the deduction
to the employer was still decided under the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939. Except as to the period when the deduction
may be taken, however, there is no reason to believe that the posi-
tion of the court would be any different under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.
Conclusion
At present it seems that well-advised employers are still able
to make gratuitous payments to the widows of former employees in
such a manner that the payments are deductible to the employer yet
not includible in the income of the widow. The IRS considers this to
be an anomalous situation but apparently the Supreme Court does
not.67
The fact that the IRS ceased to litigate the matter under the
1939 Code,68 does not indicate that the Commissioner is retreating
from his position. The IRS still considers voluntary payments re-
ceived by a widow from the former employer of her deceased hus-
band, under the circumstances of the Reed case,69 as death benefits
under Section 101(b) rather than gifts.70 The Reed decision will not
be followed by the IRS as a precedent in subsequent disposition of
similar cases.71
64 Id., again invoking I.T. 8329, 1939-2 Cum. Bull. 158.
65 Id., citing Rev. Rul. 54-625, 1954 Cum. Bull. 85, 87. The company
payments to the widow of its former president were made over a period of
eleven years but equalled only thirty-one months' salary. This was held to be a
"limited period" and the payments were deductible.6 6 Id at 1096.
67 See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 287 (1960), where the Gov-
ernment made this contention and the Court recognized this anomalous situation
but gave it only limited weight, if any, in determining the test of a "gift."68 Rev. Rul. 50-613, 1958-2 Gum. Bull. 914.69 United States v. Reed, 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky. 1959), affd 277




The IRS has not tested the deductibility of these payments to
widows by the payor under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. If,
however, these payments continue to be viewed as "gifts" to the
widow, the IRS may direct its emphasis upon the disallowance of
the deduction to the employer.
In two recent cases it seems that the Commissioner may be win-
ning the battle as to the widow's return. In Estate of Mervin G. Pier-
pont72 the Tax Court, relying on the Duberstein case,73 held that
voluntary payments to the widow of a former corporate officer were
"in recognition of [the deceased's] . . . services" and represented a
"continuation of salary." Even though the IRS agreed that the de-
ceased had been compensated in full for his services up to his death,
the court viewed the payments as taxable income from services, sub-
ject to the $5,000 death benefit exclusion under Section (101)(b).
The second case, Estate of Martin Kuntz, Sr.,74 had a similar holding.
Under the Duberstein case 75 the Supreme Court has stated that
the proper criterion in determining whether a transfer is a gift "is
one that inquires what the basic reason for [the payor's] . . . conduct
was in fact-the dominant reason that explains his action in making
the transfer."70 The Court noted that there was no conclusive test
and that each gift-versus-income case must be decided on its own
facts with primary weight to be given to the conclusion of the trier
of fact.77
Before the battle is conceded to the Commissioner's views one
last case should be considered. In United States v. Kasynski78 the
Tenth Circuit also used the "Duberstein Rule" again to hold that
these voluntary payments to widows are "gifts."
We can conclude only that the taxability (or deductibility) of
voluntary payments to widows from former employers of their de-
ceased husbands is still an unsettled area. The employer may still
deduct the payments, which are nevertheless excluded entirely from
the widow's income. The key factor seems to be the intention of the
transferor. We must recognize, however, that the Commissioner is
relentlessly working to remove this anomalous "loophole."
Thomas L. Jones
7235 T.C. -, No. 10, CCH Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. 24, 408 (1960).
73363 U.S. 278 (1960).
74 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1379 (1960).
75363 U.S. 278 (1960).
76 Id. at 286.
77 Id. at 287-290.
78284 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960).
